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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a stimulating and often discussed paper, John Van Huyck, Raymond Bat-
talio and Richard Beil (1990) (hereafter referred to as VBB) demonstrate the
disturbing result that in a game with a set of Pareto-ranked equilibria subjects
routinely select the Pareto-worst outcome.
While this result seems odd, it is consistent with a large number of game the-
oretic papers all of which demonstrate that Pareto inferior outcomes are likely
in a setting where the Pareto dominant outcome is also the most risky. For
example, Crawford demonstrates the VBB results are consistent with results in
evolutionary game theory (see Crawford ( 1991)) since the Pareto-worst equi-
librium of the VBB game is the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for the
game. 1 He also demonstrates how such results could be the outcome of a learn-
ing process which converges to the Pareto-worst equilibrium. Carlsson and Van
Damme (1993) study 2x2 global games in which risk dominant equilibria are
∗Resources for the research were provided by the National Science Foundation grant num-
ber SES 0111640 and by both the Center for Experimental Social Science and the C.V. Starr
Center for Applied Economics at New York University. We would also like to thank Shachar
Kariv for both his comments and research assistance and Bogachan Celen for his comments.
In addition, we thank John VanHuyck for providing us with a copy of his instructions as well
as the Indian Statistical Institution for allowing us to conduct some experiments there.
1The intuition here is simple. If all subjects coordinate on the same number greater than
1, then a Nash equilibrium results. However, assume that one subject mutates or trembles
and chooses an integer below the commonly chosen alternative. Then his or her payoﬀ will
be greater than those who did not deviate and by standard evolutionary arguments (perhaps
imitation here) we would expect that type of behavior to reproduce in the population at a
fatser rate than the original equilibrium behavior and eventually wipe it out. Such a Darwinian
argument can be made for all but the all-1 equilibrium and hence the strategy 1 is the unique
evolutionarily stable strategy.
1the unique equilibrium expected to be selected despite the existence of another,
Pareto dominant, equilibrium. Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995) generalize this re-
sult and give conditions under which we would expect it to occur. Finally, and
most importantly for our purposes, Rubinstein (1989) shows that such results
are possible when the players have “almost” but not “total” common knowledge
of the payoﬀs of the game. Rubinstein adds, however, that while such an out-
come is logically consistent, it is not intuitively appealing and hence we should
search for the other heuristics that decision makers might use in such contexts
that might lead them to the Pareto dominant outcome.
In this paper we concern ourselves with the external validity of results like
those of VBB since if humans were subject to such perverse group irrationalities
as those observed in the laboratory and supported by theory, we might expect
to see a world trapped more tightly in the grip of ineﬃciency then perhaps we
do. Hence, we suspect that such glaring irrationalities must be rectiﬁed over
time by a process diﬀerent than that deﬁned by these analyses.2
Focusing our attention on the Minimum Game it is our claim in this paper
that in the real world games like the Minimum Game are played in a manner
that diﬀers from that depicted in previous experimental studies. More precisely,
the Minimum Game is one of a class of coordination problems that society faces.
Most coordination problems are recurrent problems in which agents repeatedly
face the same situation over and over again.3 Two salient features of these
situations are that while the games or problems they represent are inﬁnitely (or
at least long) lived, the people who interact in them change often. These are
inﬁnitely lived games played by a sequence of ﬁnitely lived agents. Second, and
more importantly, when anyone goes to play these games they have access to
the wisdom of the past in the sense that those who have played before them (or
at least immediately before them) are available to give them advice as to how
to play. While the conventions passed from one generation of decision maker
to the next may not be eﬃcient solutions to the problem at hand, they at least
avoid the need to have these problems repeatedly solved each time a new agent
or set of agents arrive.
The VBB design captures neither of these features of evolutionary coordina-
tion games: it has neither an inter-generational structure nor an opportunity for
subjects to pass on advice to their successors. Furthermore, these features are
not included in any of the game-theoretical papers mentioned (namely Carls-
s o na n dV a nD a m m e ( 1993) and Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995)) since they are
2One should not conclude from this statement that we assume that the world around us
is constantly in a Pareto Optimal state. On the contrary, we are willing to assume that there
are substantial ineﬃciencies out there. However, we are assuming that if we humans were
to prove ourselves so incapable of rectifying the most egregious violations of rationality, we
would see a far more disfunctional world than we actually do.
3For example, deciding which side of the road to drive on was a recurrent problem faced
by social agents as soon as roads were built and vehicles traveled on them. The problem
of deciding how hard to work at the work place, “work norms”, was one faced by modern
industrial workers each day on assembly lines at the turn of the century as well as previously
by primitve hunters each time they hunted in packs -a repeated stag-hunt game (see Bryant
(1983)). Numerous other examples exist as well.
2obviously static models of the phenomenon.
In the experiments discussed in this paper we present an inter-generational
game version of the VBB experiment similar to that found in Schotter and
Sopher (2001,2 0 0 1a, 2001b) that investigates the Battle of the Sexes, Trust
Games, and Ultimatum, respectively. In this experiment groups of 8 subjects
a r er e c r u i t e di n t ot h el a ba n dp l a yt h es a m eg a m ep a y e db ys u b j e c t si nt h e
VBB paper (the Minimum Game) for 10 periods. After their participation is
over each one is replaced by another agent, their laboratory descendent, who
then plays the game for another 10 periods with a fresh group of new subjects
so the generations are non-overlapping. Advice from a member of one gener-
ation to his or her successor can be passed along via free-form messages that
generation t players leave for their generation t+1 successors. Finally, payoﬀs
span generations in the sense that the payoﬀ to a generation t player is equal
to what he or she has earned during his or her lifetime plus what their children
earn. Hence, incentives exist for subjects to pass on intelligent advice.
It was our conjecture that if we played the Minimum Game using such an
inter-generational design then, over time, generations would be able to “talk
themselves to eﬃciency” in the sense that after playing the game, if any gen-
eration converged to a Pareto-worst equilibrium, they might advise the next
generation to choose higher knowing that following their behavior was a ﬁrst
step on the path to mutually assured destruction. Wise subjects might say, “do
as we are telling you to do not as we did”, and such advice, if followed, might
lead to a convention selecting the Pareto-superior outcome. Hence, we expected
that outcomes in our inter-generational game would be more eﬃcient than those
found by VBB. (It is of course possible that subjects would have learned the
exact opposite lesson, that people can not be trusted, and pass that on to their
successors. Hence, advice could just as easily reinforce ineﬃciency as reduce it.)
What we ﬁnd is that it was much harder for societies to ”talk themselves to
eﬃciency” than we expected. More precisely, we ﬁnd that the Pareto dominant
equilibrium emerges only in circumstances where advice is not only public (in
the sense that all advice from a previous generation is oﬀered to each successor
in the next generation) but its publicness is common knowledge (in the sense
that it is read aloud for all members of a generation to hear). Private advice
between a predecessor and his or her successor or even public advice that is
shared (i.e. all players in generation t are given a sheet specifying each piece
of advice oﬀered by the members of generation t-1 and all subjects know that
all others have been given the same sheet) but not read aloud, what we call
the equivalent of Rubinstein’s “almost common knowledge” does a poor job of
rasing the minimum.
In some sense then, our results demonstrate the same discontinuity in behav-
ior predicted by Rubinstein (1989). When the advice oﬀered by one generation
to the next is only “almost-common knowledge” (i.e. each person in a genera-
tion can read all the advice oﬀered by the previous generation and knows that
all others are reading the same sheet who commonly know that everyone is read-
ing it also) outcomes converge to the Pareto worst level. Introducing common
3knowledge of advice by reading the advice out loud, leads to Pareto eﬃciency.4
While private advice does not seem to change the behavior of the minimum
choice of our subject groups in the Minimum Game, we conjectured that it
might change the behavior of the group choices above the minimum, i.e. it
might change the distribution of choices even if it left the minimum (the lowest
order statistic) the same. For example, it might be that groups with advice are
more trusting in that while there is always one person who makes a low choice,
the rest of the group might show themselves to be more willing to cooperate
and make higher choices for longer periods of time. By and large, except for
groups with public advice (or in some instances where subjects could see both
advice and history), we have to reject this conjecture also. In fact, just the
opposite is true for groups with private advice only, i.e., where they were not
able to look at the history of actions in the past but simply were given advice
by their predecessors. Their actions were more uncooperative even than those
groups without advice.
Finally, we ﬁnd the interesting phenomenon that in private advice experi-
ments advice tends to be pessimistic in that it tends to suggest to successors
that they choose their Pareto-worst action and stick with it. Surprisingly, this
advice is typically ignored in the ﬁrst round of the subsequent generation, as
subjects tend to take a chance and choose a number higher than they were ad-
vised. As time goes on, however, they quickly learn to choose the lowest so that
by the end of the experiment (after 10 repetitions), they not only choose the
worst action, 1, but suggest it to their successors. Hence, rather than experience
teaching subjects the folly of their ineﬃcient ways, it teaches them the wisdom
of selﬁsh choice which they pass on to their successors. Such advice is ignored,
initially, and then its wisdom recognized in time to be passed on once again.
We will proceed as follows. In the next section we will present our experi-
mental design. This will be followed by a presentation of our results where we
analyze not only the actions chosen by our subjects but the advice they oﬀer
and the beliefs they hold given this advice. In the ﬁnal section we will oﬀer
some concluding remarks.
2 Experimental Design
The game played by our subjects is identical to the Minimum Game performed
by VBB except that we played it using 8 instead of 14o r16s u b j e c t sa sd i d
VBB. More speciﬁcally, in this game each subject in a set of 8 subjects chose
an integer, ci, from the set {1,2,3,...,7}. Individual payoﬀs are determined for
each subject by the payoﬀ function
πi = a[min{c1,....,cn}] − bci, (1)
4VanHuyck (1992) found that under certain circumstances it is possible to coordinate be-
havior and select a Pareto optimal outcome when there is a common knowledge announcement
suggesting that action proﬁle. The games they study diﬀer from ours and they ﬁnd diﬃculties
achieving Pareto Optimal outcomes when the Pareto dominant outcomes are risky.
4a,b > 0. In other words, the payoﬀ for any player is equal to a constant, a, times
the minimum choice of any subject minus another constant, b, times i’s choice.
Choosing a = $0.20 and b = $0.10d e ﬁnes the game depicted in Table 1 which
is the identical payoﬀ table used by VBB.
Your Choice
Table 1: Payoﬀ Table in VBB’s Minimum Game
Minimum Choice of Others
7654321
7 1.30 1.100 . 9 00 . 7 00 . 5 00 . 3 00 . 10
6_ 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20
5_ _ 1.100 . 9 00 . 7 00 . 5 00 . 3 0
4 ___1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40
3 _ _ _ _ 0.90 0.70 0.50
2 _____0 . 8 0 0 . 6 0
1 ______0 . 7 0
In this payoﬀ matrix the Nash equilibria are displayed along the diagonal and
are Pareto-ranked. The best payoﬀ occurs when all subjects choose 7 but since
the cost of one’s choice is subtracted from the common payoﬀ to all, higher
choices are more risky. In fact, the mini-max or secure strategy choice is to
choose ci =1 .
In the experiment discussed in this paper we present an inter-generational
game version of the VBB experiment. In this experiment groups of eight subjects
are recruited into the lab and play the VBB Minimum Game for 10p e r i o d s .
After their participation is over each one is replaced by another agent, their
laboratory descendent, who then plays the minimum game for 10 periods and
are then replaced by eight successors who take their place and play on. When
generations change, after 10 periods of repetition, outgoing agents are allowed
to pass on advice in the form of free-form written messages to their successors.
The successors, depending on the treatment, are able to view these messages
and some subset of the history of play of previous generations before they make
their choices. Payoﬀs are equal to the sum of what an agent earns during his
lifetime plus what his successor earns in the next generation so there is complete
inter-generational caring or zero one-period ahead discounting. Finally, before
the ﬁrst and last of the 10 periods of any agent’s life, we ask them to state their
beliefs (using a proper scoring rule) deﬁning the frequency with which they
expect each of the 7 strategies will be played in the eight person population.
This gives us insight into the history of beliefs in the population.
In the ﬁrst period of any generation, subjects are presented with a set of
written instructions which are read to them out loud after they are ﬁnished
reading them privately. After questions are answered, depending on the treat-
ment, subjects are allowed to view the history of the previous generations and
r e a dt h ea d v i c eo ﬀered by their predecessor. In some treatments they are only
allowed to read the advice oﬀered by their predecessor in the previous genera-
tion but can not see the previous history of generations. After the last period,
subjects write out advice to their successors and leave. (When they write ad-
vice they know whether it is to be made public to all eight subjects in the next
5generation or simply be read privately by their successor) They are paid upon
completion of the next generation and are paid the sum of their payoﬀsi nt h e10
period game they played, plus the sum of what their successors earned in their
play of the minimum game. They are also paid for their predictions according
to a quadratic scoring rule. (See the Appendix for a description of the scoring
rule used).
We performed a set of four diﬀerent experiments which varied according to
the information available to subjects. In Experiment 1, the Replicator (No-
Advice) Experiment, we aimed to replicate the Van Huyck et al. design (albeit
with only 8 rather than 14o r16 subjects) running the Minimum Game as they
did without either generations or advice. In short, we simply ran the VBB
experiment with eight subjects for 10p e r i o d s .
In running our inter-generational experiments we started by running a ”Gar-
den of Eden” or Progenitor experiment in which eight subjects played the Min-
imum Game for the ﬁrst time and hence with no advice. This generation was
the progenitor of all generations in all treatments in the experiment in the sense
that the ﬁrst generations of all the treatments that followed all used the ad-
vice of this progenitor generation. For example, in Experiment 3 we had six
generations of subjects play the Minimum Game in circumstances where each
generation, upon arrival in the ﬁrst period of their life, could view the history
of all actions taken by all generations before them and also could receive advice
from the generation before them. Here advice was private so that while each
agent knew that the others were receiving advice, they did not know the content
of any advice other than their own. This was the Advice- Plus- History treat-
ment. Experiment 4 also had six generations of subjects playing the Minimum
Game except here subjects could only receive advice from their successor but
could not see any history of play. The ﬁrst generation here received the same
progenitor advice as did the subjects in Experiment 3. This experiment was
called the Advice-Only experiment.
Finally, Experiment 5 was a Public Advice Experiment. This experiment
was run diﬀerently for the ﬁrst ﬁve and last four generations. During the ﬁrst
ﬁve generations before play started in the ﬁrst period, subjects were given a
sheet of paper upon which was written the advice oﬀered by each of the sub-
jects in the previous generation. (The ﬁrst generation here received all the
advice from the Progenitor Experiment). As a result, while each subject knew
that all other subjects could read all of the advice oﬀered by all subjects in
the previous generation, they had no idea if they actually read the sheet or
how carefully they actually read it. Hence, we call this the ”Almost-Common-
Knowledge Public-Advice” Treatment. Starting with Generation 6, however,
we not only gave subjects the advice sheets listing all the advice given, but
actually read these pieces of advice out loud so the content of the advice on
theses sheets was common knowledge. This we call the ”Common-Knowledge
Public-Advice” Treatment. In none of these generations did subjects receive
any history information.
Our exact experimental design is summarized by the following table:















2. Progenitor 11 08
No history or advice
but advice left 8
3. History
&A d v i c e 6 108
Private Advice
and History 48
4. Advice Only 6 108
Private Advice
Only 48







The experiments were performed at Washington State University and the
Center for Experimental Social Science (C.E.S.S) at New York University. Inex-
perienced subjects were recruited from undergraduate courses and participated
for about one and on half hours. Average payoﬀs were approximately $19.00.
3R e s u l t s
We will present the discussion of our results by ﬁrst describing the behavior of
the minimum choices in our ﬁve experiments. When this is completed we will
discuss the impact of common knowledge and almost common knowledge on our
results. We will then discuss how the existence of advice aﬀects the distribution
of choices above the minimum. Next, we will look at the advice oﬀered subjects
in our experiments in an eﬀort to explain under what circumstances such advice
was followed and what explains its content. Finally, we will look at the reported
beliefs of our subjects.
3.1 Minimum Choices
Table 3a shows the behavior of the minimum in the various diﬀerent treatments
in our experiment, while Table 3b does so for the VBB experiments.
5In the very last generation of or Public Advice treatment, we only had 7 subjects instead
of the 8 that we used in every other session.
7Table 3a: Observed Minimum Choices
P e r i o d 1234567891 0
Experiment 1: Progenitor 1111111111
Experiment 2: Replicator


































8Table 3b: Group Minima - VBB Experiment









In Figure 1 we present the period-by-period minimum choices of subjects
f o re a c ho fo u rﬁve experiments along with those of the subjects in the seven
experiments run by VBB. Here we show the pattern of choices made by each
generation (in the various treatments) over all 10 periods. Each block in Figure
1 represents one generation and shows the choices that particular generation
made over all 10p e r i o d s .
<<Figure 1 about here>>
As can be seen from Tables 3a and 3b and Figure 1, the behavior of group
minima in the VBB and our Replicator (No-Advice) experiments (without ad-
vice) is dramatic. First note that in the VBB experiments in no period of any
of the 7 experiments run was the minimum greater than 4 and in no experiment
did the minimum remain above 1 for more than three periods. In two of the
seven experiments we observe 1 chosen in each period. This behavior is even
more dramatic in our four replicator experiments. Here in no period was the
minimum greater than 2 and that only occurred in two experiments during the
ﬁrst period. Beyond that all minima were equal to 1.
It was exactly this behavior that we expected would disappear when we
introduced advice into our design. To our surprise we found just the oppo-
site to be true. For example, in the Advice-Only Experiment (Experiment 4)
the behavior exhibited was more uncooperative that in either the VBB or our
replicator experiments. In no period of any generation did we ever observe a
minimum above 1. Hence, it appears as if a treatment where subjects can not
observe previous history but can pass on advice is hostile to eﬃciency in a risky
environment.
When advice and history are available as in Experiment 3, things change
somewhat. Here, as in the Advice-Only Experiment, in four of the six genera-
tions (generations 1,2 ,5 ,a n d6 )w eo b s e r v e dam i n i m u mo f1 in each period.
However, in generation 3, we observe the ﬁrst instance of an interior equilibrium
existing for all 10 periods. Here the minimum starts out in period 1 at 4 and
stays at that level for the remainder of the experiment. In the next generation
we also see an elevated minimum of 2 existing from period 2 to period 9. These
two generations exhibit behavior diﬀerent than any seen in the VBB or Repli-
cator experiments since they exhibit the ﬁrst instances of a minimum above
1 lasting past period 3. Still, these results can not be considered evidence of
any strong impact of advice or behavior in our inter-generational game set up.
Finally, in spite of the fact we see a minimum higher than 1 for 10 generations
9in this experiment, subjects in this treatment ﬁnd it impossible to sustain that
level of cooperation and by Generations 6 and 7, the minimum is again 1 for all
10p e r i o d s .
In order to ﬁnd truly diﬀerent minimum behavior one must look at the results
of Experiment 5 where we have public advice. The pattern of behavior here is
interesting. In generation 1 we see no increase in the minimum choice in any
period. However, remember this generation received the advice of the progenitor
generation which was written not knowing that it would be made public to
all successors. Generation 2, however, behaved similarly by not succeeding in
raising the minimum above 1 in any period. Generation 3 was signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent in that the ﬁrst period the minimum started out at 6, decreased to 5
for two periods, then dropped to 4 before crashing back to 1 for the remaining
periods. This behavior was not so diﬀerent than that observed in the VBB
experiments except that the minimum of 6 reached in the ﬁrst period was greater
than any observed in VBB and this above-1 behavior lasted till period 4 which
is one period longer than any VBB behavior. Generations 4 and 5 exhibited
similar behavior starting out at 4 and quickly crashing to 1.
It was at this point that we read out loud the Generation 5 advice to all
subjects in Generation 6. As you can see this had a dramatic impact raising
the minimum to 7 in all ten periods. From this generation on in no period was
the minimum choice below 5 (which occurred only once) and was 7 for 30 of
the total 40 periods. (Of the remaining 10 periods it was 6 in nine of them
and 5 in one.) In short, this treatment, public advice with common knowledge,
was successful in breaking the strangle hold that the all-1 equilibrium had on
behavior up until this point.
Hence, while these agents were ﬁnally capable of “talking themselves to
eﬃciency”, the process was much harder than we expected and occurred only
when advice was public and common knowledge. 6
3.1.1 A Connection to Rubinstein’s Electronic Mail Game
Ariel Rubinstein (19 8 9 )i nt h e” T h eE l e c t r o n i cM a i lG a m e :S t r a t e g i cB e h a v i o r
Under ‘Almost Common’ Knowledge” investigates the discontinuity in behavior
that results when subjects move from having “almost common knowledge” to
common knowledge of the payoﬀso ft h eg a m e .I nt h a tg a m e ,t w op l a y e r s1 and
2 are involved in a coordination problem. Each can take one of two actions, A
or B, and there are two possible states of nature a and b. State a occurs with
6Note that including advice in our experiments is diﬀerent from either including cheap talk
or allowing free communication amongst decision makers, both of which have been known to
increase eﬃciency. (See Cooper et. al.(1989, 1992) and Dawes et. al (1977). Cheap talk
statements are public non-binding and payoﬀ irrelevant statements made by the players who
are actually going to play the game and not their predecessors. In contrast, except for the
public advice treatment, our advice statements are private and made by predecessors. Even
when we made advice public and common knowledge, these statements are still not made by
t h ep e o p l ew h oa r ea b o u tt op l a yt h eg a m e .
Our advice treatments are diﬀerent from the communication treatments found in public
goods experiments since we only permit one-sided statements to be made and not bilateral or
multilateral non-binding discussions.
10probability (1- p) and b with probability p with p < 1/2. In the state of nature
a(b) the players get a positive payoﬀ M if both choose the action A(B). If they
choose the same action but the “wrong” one, they get 0 while if they choose
diﬀerent actions the one choosing B gets a negative payoﬀ and the other gets
zero. Strategy A is therefore the secure strategy since it never yields a negative
payoﬀ. Rubinstein describes the informational aspects of the game as follows:
The information about the state of nature is known initially only
to player 1. Without transferring the information, the players can
not achieve an expected payoﬀ higher than (1-p)M. If the informa-
tion could be common knowledge they could achieve a payoﬀ of M.
However, imagine that the two players are located at two diﬀerent
sites and they communicate only by electronic mail. Due to techni-
cal diﬃculties there is a small probability, ε, that the message does
not arrive at its destination. ......it is assumed that, when player
1 gets the information that the state of nature is b, his computer
automatically sends a message (a blip) to player 2 and then player
2’s computer conﬁrms the message and then player 1’s computer
conﬁrms the message and so on. If the message does not arrive the
communication stops. No message is sent if the state of nature is
a. At the end of the communication stage the screen displays the
number of messages his machine has sent. (Rubinstein (1989, p.
386))
If the machines exchanged messages inﬁnitely then there would be common
knowledge of the state and coordination would be easy. Rubinstein demon-
strates, however, that for any ﬁnite number of exchanges, the only equilibrium
is for both players to choose A in each period. Hence, even for a large number of
exchanges, where we might think that players have “almost common knowledge”
of the information, we see that the players can not obtain an expected payoﬀ,
in equilibrium, higher than that they could achieve without any information
exchange. There is a discontinuity when common knowledge is achieved.
If one is willing to accept the notion that having it be common knowledge
that all players are reading the same advice sheet is similar to Rubinstein’s
notion of “almost common knowledge” while reading that advice out loud is
equivalent to the advice being ”common knowledge” (using some metric not
speciﬁed here) then this experiment has replicated a result in the spirit of Ru-
binstein’s theorem since behavior in the almost common knowledge treatment
diﬀers dramatically from that of the common knowledge experiment and in the
direction predicted, i.e. they choose the safer and Pareto inferior outcome.
It is important to note that there is one major diﬀerence between our situa-
tion and that described by Rubinstein ( 1989) which prevents us from claiming
any formal correspondence between the two. It is that while Rubinstein and
others are dealing with games of incomplete information where players must
determine whether there is common knowledge of the payoﬀs, our situation is
one where people are perfectly informed about the payoﬀs of the game but do
11not know whether everyone has interpreted the commonly read or announced
announcements as indicating that they should all choose seven. In our experi-
ment the distinction is between having common and almost-common knowledge
of public advice and perhaps its meaning. (For example, if public advice is not
read out loud a subject might wonder if a player really read the statements all
the way to the bottom and noticed the strong urging to choose 7, etc. When the
statements are read out loud, then at least one can have faith that they were
heard).
Our result, however, is only valid if the advice given subjects in the almost-
common knowledge treatment is basically equivalent to what they receive in
t h ec o m m o n -k n o w l e d g et r e a t m e n ts i n c ei ft h ea d v i c ei nt h ef o r m e rw e r em o r e
uncooperative, then obviously it might lead to more uncooperative behavior
whether or not it was common or almost commonly known.
To demonstrate that this is in fact the case, we have placed the exact ad-
vice oﬀered to all generations of the public advice treatment in the appendix.
Note that the while the advice oﬀered to the ﬁrst two generations was rather
pessimistic, there is little to distinguish the advice given to generations 3-5 (the
last three periods of the almost-common knowledge treatment) from generations
6-9 (the common-knowledge treatment). While some statements raise the pos-
sibility of choosing low numbers, especially once someone else has started the
ball rolling, almost all of the statements suggest choosing 7 initially and then
following any trends that develop. Many are emphatic, however, about sticking
with 7 always.
To give some quantitative content to these texts, we coded them, as we will
explain later, with reference to what advice they suggest for the ﬁrst round of
play if any was oﬀered. In other words, we gave a 7 to advice which clearly sug-
gested choosing 7 in the ﬁrst round a 6 to those pieces of advice that suggested
6 etc. While much of the advice was in terms of dynamic rules, most of the rules
s t a r t e dw i t hs u g g e s t i n ga na c t i o ni np e r i o d1 followed by a way to respond to
what happens there. (If it made no suggestion about a ﬁrst round action, we
coded it with a zero. If it suggested starting out “high” we coded it 5.5 while if
it suggested starting out “low” we coded it 2.2).
Table 4: Coded Advice in the Public Advice Experiment
S u b j e c t 1 23456 78I n f o r m a t i o n
Generation
1 11 071 0 0 0 Almost Common
2 1 11111 7 7 Almost Common
3 7 70777 77A l m o s t C o m m o n
4 6 77770 77A l m o s t C o m m o n
5 4o r5 1 7705 . 577A l m o s t C o m m o n
6 7 77777 77C o m m o n
7 7 77777 77C o m m o n
8 7 77777 77C o m m o n
9 7 77777 77C o m m o n
12Table 4 presents the coded advice data for all the public advice experiments.
As you can see, after Generation 2 the advice received by the Almost-Aommon
and Common Knowledge treatments is very much the same. From this we can
conclude that the diﬀerence in behavior between the common knowledge and
almost-common knowledge treatments was the result of the diﬀerent informa-
tional conditions and not the actual content of the advice.
3.1.2 Non-Minimum Behavior
Cooperativeness Index While the impact of private advice on group minima
was not strong that does not mean that advice might not have had an impact
on subject behavior. For example, the observed minium of a group is merely
the lowest order statistic of the distribution of their choices. The distribution
of choices generating these minima could diﬀer greatly yet these diﬀerences
would not be noticed in an environment where only the minimum was reported.
Just reporting the minimum of the groups then could disguise a willingness
to cooperate that may very well diﬀer from one treatment to the next. For
example, take two groups both of which have a reported minimum of 1 but one
has seven people choosing 1 and one choosing 7 while the other has just the
opposite, seven choosing 7 and only one choosing 1. Clearly, the ﬁrst group is
more uncooperative than the second yet we would not know it from the minima.
To provide a quick scalar measure of this cooperativeness of a group of
subjects period by period, we calculate a cooperation index as follows. Since
the cooperativeness of a group of subjects in any period is maximized when
all subjects choose 7 and since we have 8 people, if each choose 7 the sum
of their choices would be 56. If we take the actual sum of the choices made
by our eight subjects and divide it into 56, (and multiply it by 100) we get a
percentage measure of how cooperative the behavior in the group was. If all
choose 7 we get an index of 100% while if all choose 1 we get an index of 14.28%
(= 8
56 · 100).For each of our treatments we can calculate the mean cooperative
index by calculating this percentage period by period for each generation and
averaging. These averages are portrayed in Table 5 .
What we ﬁnd here is that subjects in the treatment with private advice and
no history fare the worst. In fact subjects in this treatment show less cooperation
than subjects in the treatment with no advice or history. Making history of past
plays available improves cooperation somewhat. Public advice leads to even
more cooperative choices. But while the almost common knowledge for the ﬁrst
ﬁve generations of the public advice leads to increased level of cooperation, it
is only in the common knowledge scenario of the last four generations of the
public advice treatment do we see sustained and total cooperation leading to




Public Advice (First ﬁve generations) 48%
Public Advice (Last Four generations 98%
Advice Plus History 35.4%
Advice-Only 27.5%
No Advice 30.3%
At a more disaggregated level, a Wilcoxon sign-rank test (see Table 6 be-
low) demonstrates that while the mean of the cooperativeness indices in the
Advice Only and No Advice treatment are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one
another, the mean of the Advice-Plus-History treatment is signiﬁcantly higher
than either of them, while the mean of the Public-Advice experiment is signif-
icantly diﬀerent from all of the other treatments. Moreover within the Public
Advice treatment the mean cooperativeness index (98%) of the common knowl-
edge treatment (Generations 6 through 9) is signiﬁcantly higher than the mean
cooperativeness index of the almost-common-knowledge treatment (48%) (Gen-
erations 1 through 5).
Figure 2 provides a comparison of the Cooperativeness Index across our
four diﬀe r e n tt r e a t m e n t sa sw e l la st h el e v e lo fc o o p e r a t i o ni nt h eC o m m o n
Progenitor generation. As one can see from Figure 2, the mean cooperation
in the public advice treatment is much higher than those in the other three.
In Figure 3, we present the behavior of the cooperativeness index across the
9 generations of the public advice treatment. As one can see from the ﬁgure,
in the ﬁrst ﬁve generations (the almost-common knowledge scenario), while
the groups start out with a high level of cooperation in the beginning, this
cooperation degenerates over time. For the last four generations (the common-
knowledge scenario), however, high cooperation is sustained over time. These
four generations start at total cooperation and except for one group (Generation
#7, which chooses a minimum of 6 in periods 1 through 9 and 5 in period 10),
they maintain total cooperation over the 10 periods of the session.
<<Figures 2 and 3 about here>>
14Table 6: Cooperation Index





40.5 36.7 31.6 7.9 4.1 2.8 50
Value of Test
Statistic (z)
6.048 4.423 4.922 2.253 1.869 1.024 5.445
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.30 0.00
P A=P r i v a t eA d v i c e , A O=A d v i c eO n l y
AH = Advice Plus History, NA = No Advice
PACK = Public Advice Common Knowledge
PAACK) = Public Advice Almost-Common Knowledge
Overall, then the Public Advice treatment achieves 40.5% more cooperation
than the Advice Only treatment, 36.7% more than the Replicator treatment,
and 31.6% more than the Advice-Plus-History treatment. The Advice-Plus-
History treatment also exhibits signiﬁcantly higher levels of cooperation than
either the Advice-Only or the Replicator (No-Advice, No-History) treatments.
3.1.3 Robustness
Another index that could be used to see if advice has any impact on behavior
is to look at order statistics above the smallest. As stated above, looking only
at the minimum choice made by a group may mask diﬀerences in other order
statistics of the distribution of choices. For example, if we compare the third
lowest choice made by our groups it may be that advice has the eﬀect of in-
creasing that order statistic. Hence, advice, while not aﬀecting the lowest order
statistic might actually eﬀect behavior above it. To investigate this point we
present Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7: Comparison of the Mean Values of the Order Statistics
(Aggregated Over All Generations in a Treatment)
Order
Statistic
Advice Only No Advice Advice+History Public Advice
Minimum 11 .04 1.54 3.35
Minimum-11 .3 1.3 1.74 3.57
Minimum-2 1.37 1.56 1.94 3.87
Minimum-3 1.53 1.72 2.04 4.03
Minimum-4 1.78 2 2.31 4.37
Minimum-5 2.14 2.38 2.67 4.71
Minimum-6 2.80 3 3.1 5.29
Maximum 4.03 4.32 4.28 6
Table 7 presents the mean order statistic of the choices made by subjects in
each treatment aggregated over each generation. As we can see, when compared
15to the No-Advice treatment there appears to be no diﬀerence between any of the
order statistics for experiments using private advice.7 So, for example, in the
Advice-Only treatment, 1 is the mean of the minimum of all 6 groups who did
that experiment taken over all periods. Looking across row 1 of Table 7 we see
that this minimum is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those in any of the private
advice treatments yet there does appear to be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between it
and the observed minimum of the public advice treatments. Looking across all
of the other rows we see the same phenomenon. An equality of order statistics
between no-advice and private-advice treatments but a diﬀerence between all of
them and the public advice treatments.
Finally, note that the No-Advice treatment exhibits order statistics all of
which are greater than those of the Advice-Only treatment. In other words,
having no advice leads to more cooperative behavior than having advice only
without access to history. If your informational landscape is so barren as to
only have the jaundiced advice of a subject with a bad experience, then you’d
be better oﬀ not having that advice at all.
Since these means are taken over periods where all choices eventually con-
verged to 1, we might ask what these order statistics look like in the ﬁrst versus
the last ﬁve periods of these treatments. Table 8 does this.
7
Wilcoxon Tests for Order Statistics
Order
Statistic PA-AO PA-NA PA-AH AH-AO AH-NA NA-AO
Minimum 2.34*** 2.30*** 1.80* 0.54 0.50 0.04
Minimum-1 2.27*** 2.34** 1.83** 0.51 0.44 0.07
Minimum-2 2.50*** 2.31** 1.93** 0.57 0.38 0.19
Minimum-3 2.51*** 2.31** 1.99** 0.51 0.32 0.19
Minimum-4 2.58*** 2.36** 2.05** 0.53 0.31 0.22
Minimum-5 2.57*** 2.33** 2.04** 0.53 0.29 0.24
Minimum-6 2.51*** 2.29** 2.19** 0.30 0.100 . 2 0
Maximum 1.97*** 1.68** 1.72** 0.26 -0.04 0.30
***: Signiﬁcant at 1%
**: Signiﬁcant at 5%
*: Signiﬁcant at 7%
16TABLE 8: Comparison of the Mean Values of Order Statistics
































































































As we can see, over the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds the mean of all order statistics
was higher in the No-Advice treatment than in the Advice-Only treatment and
virtually identical to the order statistics of the Advice-Plus History treatment.
One thing of interest is how uncooperative these order statistics are. For exam-
ple, over the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds of any treatment, the mean of the third-highest
order statistic (minimum-5) is only 4.084, 4.36, and 4.17 in the Advice-Only,
No-Advice, and Advice Plus History treatment. (It was 6.178 for the Public
Advice Experiments). This means, that on average, even those who chose high
numbers did not choose very high ones. Hence, you have to go almost to those
people who chose the highest number in any period before you get to see num-
bers approaching 7 and even then for the Private and No-Advice treatments we
only see choices of about 5.
173.2 Advice
There are two things that interest us about advice. First we would like to know
whether it is followed and second, what determines its content? If the introduc-
tion of advice into our experiment is going to have an impact on behavior then
we would expect that it would be followed. If it is going to increase cooperation,
we would expect that it would suggest a cooperative course of behavior.
To investigate these questions we took the advice messages written by our
subjects and coded them according to what we think they implied about what
action suggested for the ﬁrst period of any generation’s life. For example, if a
subject said, “Choose 7 in period 1 and then choose the period t-1 minimum
in period t” , we coded this with a 7 since it indicated that in the ﬁrst period
7 should be chosen and then the subject should look around and see what
happened and then follow the minimum thereafter. Such advice was fairly
typical in that most advice messages suggested dynamic rules for subjects to
follow. The problem is that in certain cases they did not specify what action
to take in period 1. For example, a subject may write, ”Choose the minimum
of last period”. This rule is well speciﬁed for all rounds but the ﬁrst. In other
cases a subject may write, ”Choose pretty high in round 1 a n dt h e nf o l l o wt h e
minimum of last period”. To consistently code this data we took all statements
that oﬀered no advice for the ﬁrst period and coded it with a zero and imputed a
5.5 (2.2) to all advice suggesting a “high” (“low”) action in round 1, i.e. advice
that did not specify a number but implied a range of numbers. Pieces of advice
that were nonsense, gibberish, were also coded with a zero. In all, there were
only 24 pieces of advice that fell into this category. (In two cases the subject
suggested choosing either 4 or 5 or 1 or 2 which we indicated).
In Table 9 we provide a summary of the advice received by the subjects in
diﬀerent treatments. In this part of our analysis we exclude all advice coded
“0”, i.e. advice that was considered nonsensical. In Table 10w ep r o v i d es o m e
summary information about advice received by a generation, their ﬁrst period
action, last period actions taken by those same generations and the advice they
left for the succeeding generation.
18Table 9: Summary of Coded Advice Received
Coded Advice Advice Only Advice+History Public Advice
1 28 20 10
1o r2 1 00
2.2 4 1 0
4 04 0
4o r5 00 1
5.5 02 1
6 00 1
6o r7 0 1 0
7 55 4 3
Total 38 33 56











1.93 4.0625 1.25 1.75
Advice&
History
2.75 4.6875 1.98 3.05
Public Advice 5.41 6.46 3.52 5.375
Public Advice
(Gens 1-5)
5.02 6.2 1.775 5.2975
Public Advice
(Gens 6-9)
7 6.95 6.69 7
Looking at Table 9 ﬁrst, note the preponderance of subjects advising their
successors to chose “7” in the Public-Advice treatment. 43 subjects did so
in the public advice treatment as opposed to 5 in the advice only treatment
and 5 in the Advice Plus History treatment. Note also that advice in both
the Advice-Only experiment as well as the Advice-Plus-History experiment is
considerably below that of the Public-Advice experiment. The mean advice
received in the Advice Only treatment is 1.93, while that in the Advice Plus
History treatment is 2.75 and in the Public-Advice treatment it is 5.41.U s i n g
a set of pair-wise Wilcoxon sign-rank tests we see that when we test the null
hypothesis that the samples of non-zero coded advice coming from any two
experiments came from the same population, we see that we can reject this
hypothesis for the Advice-Only Public-Advice comparison( z= 4.76, p = .00)
and the Public-Advice Advice-Plus-History comparison (z = 3.403, p-value =
0.00). However there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the quality of advice
left in the Advice-Only and Advice-Plus-History treatments at the 5% level (z
=- 1. 6 2 7 ,p=0 . 10).
19It appears as if knowing that advice will be made public leads people to
write diﬀerent types of advice since in generations 3-5 of the Almost-Common
Knowledge treatment, while actions converged to 1 i nt h el a s th a l fo fe a c ho f
those generations, the advice they left was extremely cooperative and quite
diﬀerent from the advice left by private advice groups with similar histories.
For example, the mean advice left for generations 3, 4, and 5 were 6.12, 6, and
4.86, respectively (the 4.86 was caused by one piece of advice to choose 1 and one
coded 0 that was eliminated. All others were coded as 7). More importantly, the
advice left by generation 2 and given to generation 3 was extremely high (mean
6.12) and this followed a generation 2 experience which was very uncooperative.
Hence, it may well be that people tend to write diﬀerent type of advice when
they know they will be addressing the entire community as opposed to only
their own successor.
Our discussion of advice to this point only looks at what advice was oﬀered.
However, as stated above, we are also interested in whether this advice was
followed. Looking at the Advice- Only and Advice-Plus-History treatments
ﬁrst, we notice that by and large, subjects tend to choose actions in the ﬁrst
period of their experimental life which are far greater than those they are advised
to do. For example, taking all of the non-zero coded advice, i.e. all the advice
that gave a deﬁnitive suggestion for behavior in the ﬁrst round, we see from
Table 10 that the mean advice oﬀered in the Advice-Only Experiment was 1.93
while the mean action taken was 4.062. A Wilcoxon test establishes the fact
that the distribution of actions and advice are not samples taken from the same
population at the 0.00% level (z = -3.27). Hence it appears as if subjects reject
the advice to choose low and, at least in the ﬁrst round, make choices that are
considerably higher than those they are advised to. A similar result holds for
the Advice-Plus-History Experiment where the mean advice oﬀered to subjects
was 2.75 while the mean ﬁrst period action taken was 4.679. This diﬀerence was
also signiﬁcant using a Wilcoxon test at the 0.0% level (z=-3.369).
What is ironic in the private advice experiments, however, is that while sub-
jects seem willing to take a chance in the ﬁrst period of their life and ignore
the advice given to them by their predecessors and choose high, their experience
with the minimum game during their lifetimes teaches them that their predeces-
sors were correct so that when they retire from the game they too tend to give
advice which is almost identical to what they initially received and ignored. In
terms of explaining the content of advice, it seems obvious from the data that
subjects in our Private-Advice experiments oﬀer advice that is approximately
equal to the actions they take in the last period of their laboratory life. To use
a metaphor, it is as if we are born willing to trust others, reject the advice of
our cynical parents, learn life’s lessons in the school of hard knocks, and then
die leaving our children the same cynical advice we received from our parents
but rejected.
To illustrate these patterns graphically, consider Figures 4 -7 which por-
tray the advice received and ﬁrst-period actions taken by generations in the
two Private-Advice experiments, Figures 4 and 5, as well as the advice left by
subjects and their tenth-period actions in these two experiments, Figures 6 and
207.
<<Figures 4 -7 about here>>
Looking ﬁrst at the Advice-Only and Advice-Plus-History Experiment (Ex-
periments 3 and 4) there is a huge diﬀerence between the ﬁrst period actions of
subjects and the advice they receive. Quite the opposite appears to be true for
the relationship between tenth period actions and advice left since they tend to
be quite similar. To summarize these pictures consider the following facts. First
in period 1 of the Advice-Only treatment, 16 of the 28 subjects who were asked
to choose 1 by their predecessors chose to ignore that information and chose a
number 4 or higher. By period 10, however, 26 of these 28 people are choosing
“1” and leaving advice to do so. In the Advice-Plus-History treatment, 10o u t
of 20 who received advice asking them to choose 1, actually chose 7. By period
10, 13 of them choose 1.
On the other hand, the period 10 action-advice relationship is quite diﬀerent.
In the Advice-Only treatment out of 39 people for whom we have substantive
advice, 36 chose 1 in period 10. Of these 28 (78%) asked their successors to
choose 1 as well. Overall 30 out of 39 (76%) subjects advised their successors to
choose 1. In the Advice-Plus-History treatment, of the 36 people for whom we
have salient advice, 23 chose 1 in period 10 and out of them 16 subjects (70%)
advised their successors to choose 1. Overall, 19 out of 36 (53%) advised their
successors to choose 1. The mean advice in the Advice-Only treatment is slightly
higher, 1.75, than the mean period 10 action, which is 1.25. The diﬀerence in
the mean advice left and mean period 10 action is bigger in the Advice-Plus-
History, 3.05 and 1.98 respectively. Most of this diﬀerence is accounted for the
advice left by the subjects in Generation 3 who managed to sustain the interior
equilibrium of all-4.
Hence it appears as if subjects, when leaving advice, basically tend to suggest
a ﬁrst round action for their successor that is very close to how they behaved
in the last round of their generational life. Such advice, in the private advice
experiments, does not help facilitate cooperation.
Advice giving and receiving behavior was quite diﬀerent in the Public-Advice
experiments. Here, especially in the later generations (generations 3 and above)
advice tended to be high and on average this is what subjects tended to choose.
For example, the mean advice received by subjects in the Public-Advice Almost-
Common Knowledge (Common- Knowledge) experiment was 5.02 (7) while the
mean action taken was 6.2 (6.95). Neither of these mean actions were diﬀerent
from the advice they received at the 10% level. Using a Wilcoxon signrank test,
we get a z-value of -1.575 and a corresponding p-value of 0.11 for the almost
common knowledge treatment. For the common knowledge treatment the value
of the test statistic is 1.00 with a corresponding p-value of 0.32.
Thus both these groups received high advice and chose high in period 1.
But interestingly enough, for the Public-Advice Almost Common Knowledge
treatment, the subjects found it impossible to sustain this cooperation and the
mean last-period action fell to a dismal 1.775. Still this group advised their
21successors to choose high numbers and mean advice oﬀered was a much higher
5.295, a diﬀerence which was signiﬁcant at the 0.00% level using a Wilcoxon test
(z=-5.075, p = 0.00). For the Common-Knowledge experiments (see Figures 8
and 9), advice and actions are tied closely together. Every subjects received
advice asking them to choose 7, and they did so almost without exception. In
period 1, 22 out of 23 subjects who received advice to choose 7, chose 7. In
period 10, 17 out of 23 did so. As we have mentioned there was only generation
(Generation 7) which faltered a little, and failed to achieve total cooperation in
all 10p e r i o d s .
Overall in the Public-Advice experiments the vast majority of subjects ex-
horted their successors to choose 7. These relationships are presented in Figures
8a n d9 .
<<Figures 8 and 9 about here>>
3.3 Beliefs:
Another avenue through which advice may have an impact on behavior is
through its inﬂuence on beliefs. Here we are interested in comparing the beliefs
of subjects in our replicator (No-Advice) experiments to those of subjects in
our private and public advice experiments. We are interested in answering two
questions: First does the existence of advice change the distribution of beliefs
of subjects from what it would be if no advice existed? Second, does advice
increase the minimum action upon which there is positive probability placed.
The second question is important since if subjects best respond then the best
response rule is trivial: Choose that action which you think is the minimum to
be chosen by your cohorts. Hence, if any subject believes that there will be even
one other who will choose 1,t h e n1 is their best response. If advice can raise
this expected minimum, it can succeed in rasing subjects choices.
The answer to both of these questions can be seen in Figures 10a-10f which
present the results treatment by treatment. These diagrams place the various
actions 1,2,....,7 along the horizontal axis and along the vertical they display the
mean number of subjects (aggregated over all generations) predicted to choose
that action. For example, in Figure 10a we see that on average in the No-Advice
treatment subjects expected 3.6 people in their group of eight to choose 7, 1 to
choose 6, etc.(If you multiply each number by 8 you would get the total number
of choices in each category.)
<<Figures 10a-10f here>>
22Looking across these treatments we see some interesting results. First when
comparing the beliefs of subjects in our No-Advice treatment (Figure 10a) to
those in our Private- Advice treatments we see that while there appears to be
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between these distributions (a χ2 test fails to detect
any diﬀerence in the distributions of the No-Advice and either the Advice-Only
(Figure 10b) or Advice-Plus-History (Figure 10 c )t r e a t m e n t sa tt h e5 %l e v e l
(χ2
7dof =8 .88 and χ2
7dof = 14.32 respectively)), private advice does seem to lower
expectations in the sense that subjects expect more people to choose 7 in the
No-Advice treatment ( mean = 3.6) than in either the Advice-Only treatment
(mean = 2.5) or the Advice-Plus-History treatment (mean = 2.6). In addition,
subjects in the private advice treatments predict at least one person will choose 1
(m e a n=1.2 for the Advice-Only treatment and 1.4 for the Advice-Plus-History
treatment) while in the No-Advice treatment subjects expect an average of only
0.80 subjects will choose 1. Obviously, the advice oﬀered damaged beliefs in
these experiments and led them to think that fewer people are likely to choose
7a n dm o r ea r el i k e l yt oc h o o s e1.
When we move to the Public-Advice treatments the results are more dra-
matic. As can be seen by comparing Figure 10e to all the other ﬁgures, public
advice with common knowledge changes the beliefs of the subjects dramatically.
For example, in the Public Advice with Common Knowledge treatment, we see
that on average subjects expected 5.2 people to choose 7 in round 1 and no one
to choose either 1,2 ,o r3 .T h eﬁrm belief that no one will choose a low num-
ber seems to give subjects the conﬁdence which allows them to choose 7 and
maintain eﬃciency. In addition, the distribution of beliefs for this treatment
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the distribution of beliefs in all other treatments
at the 1% level. (See Table 11below which reports the results of a χ2 tests
run to test these hypotheses). When we compare the distribution of beliefs
in the Public-Advice Common and Almost-Common- Knowledge treatments,
we see that common knowledge has an impact on beliefs. For example, while
Figure 10d presents the results of all ﬁve generations of the Almost-Common
Knowledge treatment, and Figure 10e presents the beliefs of subjects in the
Common-Knowledge treatment, Figure 10f presents the beliefs of subjects in
the last three rounds only of the Almost Common Knowledge treatment. The
ﬁrst two rounds were eliminated because the advice oﬀered here came initially
from the progenitor experiment and was particularly pessimistic leading the
minimum to quickly converged to 1. Comparing Figures 10e and 10f we see
that while the Almost Common Knowledge fostered beliefs that were more like
the Common Knowledge treatment than either of the private advice treatments,
it did not succeed as completely in eliminating the possibility that some subject
might choose allow number. As can be seen by the actions taken, it may be that
even this small suspicion was enough to ruin cooperation. A χ2 test comparing
the distributions of beliefs in the Common Knowledge and Almost Common
knowledge treatments indicates
The lesson to be learned from these belief distributions is simple. Common
Knowledge plus Public Advice seems to be a necessary condition for beliefs to
be suﬃciently positive so as to lead to eﬃcient outcomes. All other settings hold
23the prospect of someone choosing 1 w h i c hl e a d st oas p i r a lo fa c t i o n st o w a r d1.
Table 11: χ2 Tests on Belief Distributions
treatment AO1 A+H PAACK PAACK (3-5)* PACK
AO -3 . 8 4 3 1.2 62.45 64.16
A+H -- 3 1.84 63.12 103.92
PAACK -- - N A 3 7 . 9 2
PAACK (3-5) 31.19
NO 8.88 14.32 11.84 26.91 34.24
AO = Advice Only, A+H = Advice-Plus History, NA = No Advice
PACK = Public-Advice Common-Knowledge,
PAACK= Public-Advice Almost-Common Knowledge
PAACK (3-5) Public-Advice Almost-Common Knowledge (Gen 3-5)
4C o n c l u s i o n s :
This paper was motivated by the conjecture that if we played a coordination
game with Pareto ranked equilibria in a manner that allowed players who had
experience with the game to advise thier successors, then this process of advice-
giving would, over time, allow all subjects to achieve an eﬃcient outcome. In this
sense we thought people could ”talk themselves to eﬃciency” through advice.
What we found is that this conjecture is basically false. If the advice oﬀered
by one generational agent to his or her descendent is private, in the sense that
no other agent can hear it although it is common knowledge that all agents are
receiving advice from their predecessors, then just the opposite occurs. Eﬃcieny
is harder to achieve. It is only when advice is both public (in the sense that
all agents in generation t are allowed to see the advice of all predecessors in
generation t-1) and common knowledge among the players (in the sense that
the advice is read out loud) that we are capable of attaining Pareto optimal
outcomes.
We found the diﬃculty of achieving eﬃciency under these circumstances
surprising but instructive since it indicates that if we expect to teach our children
the lessons of our experience, we will need to assure them that others in their
generation are being taught the same lessons and that fact must be common
knowledge.
References
[1] Bryant, J., ”A Simple rational Expectations Keynes-Type Model”, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics,V o l .9 8 ,1983, pp. 525-528
[2] Carlsson, H . and van Damme, E., ”Global Games and Equilibrium Selec-
tion”, Econometrica,V o l .6 1,( 1993), pp. 989-1018.
24[3] Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W.
Ross “Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental
Results,” Rand Journal of Economics,V o l .2 0 ,1989, 568-587
[4] Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W.
Ross “Communication in Coordination Games,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics,V o l .107, 1992, 739-771.
[5] Crawford, V., “An “evolutionarily” Interpretation of Van Hyuck, Battalio,
and Beil’s Experimental Results on Coordination”, Games and Economic
Behavior,V o l .3 ,1991, pp. 25-60.
[6] Dawes, R., McTavish, J., and Shaklee, H., ”Behavior, Communication,
and Assumptions About others People’s Behavior in a Commons Dilemma
Situation”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 35 1977, pp.
1-11.
[7] Morris, S., Rob, R., and Shin, H.S., ”p-Dominance and Belief Potential”,
Econometrica,V o l .6 3 ,1995, pp. 145-157.
[8] Rubinstein, A. ”The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under ”Al-
most Common Knowledge”, American Economic Review, Vol. 79, June,
(1989), pp. 385-391.
[9] Schotter, A. and Sopher, B., (2000), “Social Learning and Coordination
Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experimental Study”, Center
For Experimental Social Science, Mimeo, October 2001.
[10] Schotter, A. and Sopher, B.,”Advice and Behavior in an Inter-generational
Trust Game”, Mimeo, Center for Experimental Social Science, 2001b
[11] Schotter, A. and Sopher, B., Advice and Behavior in Intergenerational
Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Approach, Mimeo, Center for Exper-
imental Social Science, New York University, September 2001c.
[12] Van Huyck, J., Battalio, R., and Beil, R., ”Tacit Coordination Games,
Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure”, American Economic Re-
view,V o l .8 0 ,J u n e ,( 1990), pp. 234-248.
[13] Van Huyck, John B., Anne B. Gillette, and Raymond C. Battalio “Credible

































































































































































































Figure 4: Comparison of Advice Received and Period 1 Actions in the Advice 
Only Treatment

































Figure 5: Comparison of Advice Received and Period 1 








































































Figure 7: Comparison of Period 10 Actions and Advice Left for the Advice 
+ History Treatment


















Figure 8: Comparison of Advice Received and Period #1 Actions for the Last Four 

























Figure 9: Comparison of Advice Received and Period #10 Actions for the Last Four 
Generations in the Public Advice Treatment
Advice Received
Period #10 ActionsFigure 10a: Beliefs in the No-Advice Treatment
Figure 10b: Beliefs in the Advice-Only Treatment
Figure 10c: Beliefs in the Advice-Plus History Treatment
3.6









































7654321Almost-Common Knowledge Treatment (Generations 3-5)
Almost-Common-Knowledge Treatment
Figure 10e: Beliefs in the Public-Advice
 Common-Knowledge Treatment
Figure 10f: Advice in the Public-Advice 
Figure 10d: Beliefs in the Public-Advice
5.0






































Advice left by the Progenitor Generation 
 
My advice is that you should choose the minimum number because you will still get a better pay-off. 
Though higher number is good, it is safer to go to the minimum number which is likely the lowest number 
in the chart. You may lose some pay-off by going higher (there is a risk of also getting higher pay-off). 
 
 
If you choose 1 you are guaranteed a pay-off of 70 cents. Where if you choose anything else you are not 
guaranteed such a large pay-off. 
 
 




Have fun, watch, observe, relax. Don’t get money hungry. There’s a saying in Spanish it translates into “ a 
dove in your hands is better than 1000 doves in the air”. I hope you enjoyed that. And don’t worry about 
what everyone else is doing. 
 
 
If everyone chooses 7, everyone wins. I hoped that everyone would also see that, however someone chose 1 
to ensure that they would get 70 cents. This hurt my earnings and everyone who chose a number higher 
than 1. It forced me, and I assume others, to choose one as well, just so they could maximize profit while 1 
person or all people were choosing 1. I began to choose 2 to see if everyone else had gained enlightenment, 
unfortunately someone was still choosing 1. I recommend you try choosing 7, in hopes that people in your 
experiment have a brain. If the “1 syndrome” appears stick with 1, if they haven’t figured it out by now the 
never will. Good luck. 
 
In a perfect world everyone would pick 7 always, unfortunately someone is inevitably going to choose 1. 
Therefore, it is best to pick 1 and make a max of $7.00 in the first round section. Otherwise you will get 
less than that no matter what. 
 
 
My advice would be to use the payoff table, use the examples and read carefully the extra instructions. 
 
 
There is a definite strategy to these choices. To me it seems that the smaller number your choice of X, the 
greater your likelihood of making the most money. This is the result of the smallest value of X chosen by 
















Private Advice-Plus-History Treatment (Subjects get to see the history of all previous plays and 
receive advice from their immediate predecessors) 
 
 
Generation #1:  
 
My advice is that you should choose 1 all the time because it never failed that someone chose 1. Therefore 
making that the smallest number chosen. You would think that everyone would pick 7, so you could get the 
highest pay-off but they didn’t. So if you pick 1 then you’ll make the most amount possible. 
 
 
I don’t understand why everyone would not choose 7. If you choose 1 you are guaranteed a pay-off of 70 
cents. Where if you chose anything else you are not guaranteed such a large pay-off.  
 
 
I chose 1 all the time because in any round if one other person chose 1 and I chose higher number my pay-
of would be lower. So I played it safe with a straight 70 cent pay-off. 
 
 
If you choose what ends up being the actual lowest then you will end up better off. Watch for what is 
usually picked as the lowest number and choose it too. 
 
 
If everyone chooses 7, everyone wins. I hoped everyone would see that, however someone will always pick 
1 to ensure 70 cents. Pick 1 for all rounds to ensure maximization of profit. Round Prediction is where you 
really make the money. Round 1 prediction is scattered so pick mainly high a few middle range and the rest 
low. For the second prediction it will be all at the bottom except pick 7 as you r pick and don’t forget to 
predict that # you chose. The rest will make it for #1. 
 
 
Best advice; someone, at least one person will choose 1 every time. If you choose 1 every time, you are 
guaranteed  $7.00. If you choose 7 every time and someone chooses 1 you are guaranteed $1.00. 
 
 
My advice will be to use a strategy to maximize your money based on not knowing what others will choose 
– which path would earn the most regardless of what others chose? What “guarantees” the highest pay-off? 
You’ll only get $1.00 if you choose 7 every time. You’ll get $7.00 choosing 1 every time.  
 
 
If you always choose 1 you will be guaranteed a pay-off of 70 cents. What I observed from the previous 
experiment and the one I participated in was that the minimum was always 1. I picked a few higher 















My advice is to do round #1 with 7 to get a feel for how the others are choosing and if everyone chooses 7 
continue choosing 7 until someone chooses 1 – then begin choosing 1 for maximum payout. The first round 
is somewhat of a “trusts” round to determine if everyone figures out that if everyone chooses 7 that 
everyone gets the maximum 4 
 
 
Pick 1 in all the rounds. You could bet that everyone may pick 7 but they will not. Always pick 1. 
 
 
I chose one all of the time in order to secure a $0.70 pay-off per round. The history showed that the 
minimum was always one. 
 
 
You should choose the lowest number and you will be best off. Whatever the lowest number is of the 
previous round, choose that number. 
 
 
You should pick 1 always to maximize your payout. Someone will always pick 1 even thought you should 
pick number 7 to maximize your payout. When it comes to the prediction round, in the second round 
everyone will pick 1 but in period 1 put a high number on 1 or 7 to maximize payout. 
 
 
The advice I give to you is very similar to the advice that was left for me. Someone will always choose the 
number 1 so if you choose number 1 every time then you will earn $7.00. When I started I started using #2 
to see if I could earn a little more than 0.70. It Failed !! Stick with #1. Get your guaranteed $7.00. Good 
luck. 
 
As you can see from looking at the history of the game, it is highly likely that at least one person will 
choose 1 every time. You can assure yourself that you will make 70 cents in every period by choosing 1 
every time. This is the way to go to make the very likely maximum of $7.00 
 
 
Although it seems like everyone would want to maximize their profit, they don’t. Some of the people seem 
to be in a defensive mood and go for what they are guaranteed. I tried high numbers at first but every time 1 
was always the minimum. Try a high number at first and if doesn’t benefit you, go with 1 from then on.  
 
   
Generation #3 
 
My advice is to use the largest number in the first round to get a feel of what the minimum is going to be 
then pick the same number as the smallest X in order to maximize your pay-off. 
 
 
Play the 7 to start with if every one plays the 7 all receive the highest pay-off but they may not. See what 
the lowest chosen is i.e. 4 is chosen regularly, see what the best pay-off is if the lowest choice is always 
4…choose that #. 
 
 
After the first two rounds I realized that player who chose the minimum of 4 would not jeopardize his/her 
pay-off of $1.00 to choose a different number. In choosing the same number I was able to earn more than 
by sticking with the 1 number. 
 
 
Pick what the smallest value is in round 1. 
 
 
You should pick 4 to maximize your payout. Someone will always pick the middle of the number. When it 
comes to the prediction 1
st round put a high number on #7 and the balance on #4. In the second prediction 
round put all or most of your choices on #4 to maximize payout. 
 
 
My advice is to pick # close to first minimum choice observed. This will net you the most money for your 
painful cause which is about 20 min. Good luck. 
 
 
You can make $7.00 easily by choosing 1 every time, but I chose to have fun and pick my favorite number 




Consistently choose a middle number so that the rest of the group does too. A choice of 4 with a minimum 





Pick a high number for maximum pay-off, i.e. 7, 6 
 
 
The smartest thing is for everyone to choose seven, but no one understands this by looking at my results 
and previous experiment history. Your best choice is to always pick 1 to guarantee a payout of $7.00 
 
 
After the first 2 or 3 periods notice which number is being repeated. Stay with that number so you will 
receive the maximum bonus. 
 
 




When he starts picking the actual number, go with that same number. If he picked example 5 for actual you 




My advice is good. If you want to make the most maximum allowed by the group, pick the minimum 
number allowed in the first round. Good luck.  
 
 
I found that by picking the minimum number every time proved to be profitable. I started at my best 
number then worked my way towards the minimum number. Good luck! 
 
 
I would say play the middle number so that payoff will be $1.00 – however there may be an idiot playing a 




Pick a low number for maximum pay-off, i.e. 1 
 
 
The concept of this experiment is to pick the no. with the best possible outcome. I recommend that you pick 




Start high, hoping everyone starts high. The higher everyone goes the higher the pay-off. After 2 or 3 




Always choose 1 because no matter what the other people choose, you’ll always have earned 70 cents. 
Always choose 1 and you’ll be in control. 
 
 
When he tells you the first minimum # chosen, use that number as the choice of X the whole way. Never 
change it !! Good luck! 
 
 
Choose the value of X as equal to the minimum of from the previous round. 
 
 
Unless everybody else in the room picks high as well, you’re better off picking the minimum. I started in 
the middle range (at 4) but was undercut and lost money. In this situation I found it the most profitable to 
pick the minimum. 
 
My advice is to guess low. Let’s say 1-3. Be constant with your guess, the lower the better off you be. 
Good luck. 
 
   
Generation #6 
 









Put about 4 or 5 in 2
nd prediction 1 column as most will be picking the min # played a lot 
 





The lower the number you pick the better. Since you will at least get 70 cents if at least one other person 
(you for example) picks one. 
 
 
Start for your X value high, hoping everyone starts high. The higher everyone goes the higher the pay-off. 
After or 3 rounds choose the minimum bid with the highest pay-off. If the minimum is consistent, pick that 
for your X value, it probably won’t change. One person choosing 1 for X will bring down the whole group. 
 
 
Well, the optimal is if everyone chooses 7. But there is usually someone who does not see that fact. If one 
looks at the track record the number 4 generated the highest earnings per round. I wold give 7 or 4 a chance 
for one or two rounds. If the lowest number chosen is still 1 obviously one in the group has not gotten the 
idea to maximize earnings. Then the number 1 should be chosen for the next 8 rounds. Good luck. Hope 
you get a “smart” group. 
 
 
In order to win some amount of money (as opposed to zero) when he tells you the minimum # chosen use 
that number as the choice of X the whole way. Don’t change it! 
 
 
Choose the value of X as the lowest value possible to add to the balance steadily. 
 
 
The best case scenario is if everyone picks high. At first I chose numbers on the high side but then I found 
at least one person in my group was choosing 1. This caused me to lose money. So, I began to choose 1 for 
the remainder of the rounds to be “safe” and still earn pretty good money. My advice is start picking high 
#s and hope everyone in your group will do likewise. 
 
 









Private Advice Only Treatment (Subjects get advice from their immediate predecessor but do not get 






Choose minimum number because you will still get a better pay-off. At first I made a choice for higher #, 
but I got bad pay-off. So it is safe to go with lower # in chart.  
 
 
If you choose 1, it maybe small but a guaranteed payoff of 70 cents. Where if you choose anything else you 
are not guaranteed a steady payoff. 
 
 






If everyone chooses 7 everyone wins. However if someone picks 1 everyone else will also start picking 1 to 
maximize profit. When predicting for the first round pick high on 7 and scatter a few through the rest of the 
#s. On the second prediction all or close to all with be choosing 1. 
 
 
Someone will pick 1, might as well be you 
 
 
Pay attention to the payoff table and think what everyone else will do. 
 
 
If everyone picks higher numbers then you will make the most money but more than likely everyone will 




Predict some 7’s on the first round guess of what others will do. We had 3. Predict 2 low scores of 1. Pick 
1’s on all. By the last round all but one were at 1. Good luck: 
 
 
If you take some risk, payoff will be larger. Don’t always go for the “sure” low numbers. 
 
 
Choose number 1, as you know someone will. It has the largest payoff against itself, when chosen as the 
lowest number. This way you are guaranteed 0.70. 
 
 
To minimize losses do one’s across. On prediction some will do 7, some 3 or 4 and some 1’s. By the end all 
will choose 1 by the end. 
 
 





Study the table and then pick 1, because someone will pick it anyway. 
 
 
Choose a lower X for higher average return 
 
 






Always pick one for the largest payoff 
 
 
Don’t always go for the “sure” low minimum. But follow your instincts. 
 
 
Choose number 1, some one will. It will have the largest payoff. There will always be someone that picks 
it. This way you will get a guaranteed 0.70 
 
 
Minimize your losses by picking 1 every time – somebody will always pick 1. On the predictions, the 1
st 
time, some will pick 7 and 3 and more will pick 4 and 1. On the second prediction, everyone will pick 1. 
 
 




In the first round, choose 7, hoping for intelligence in the room, then if everyone chooses 7 continue, in all 
other cases choose 1 after first round. 
 
 
Always choose 1. 
 
 




Pick numbers 3 or below 
 
 
Don’t assume that everyone will always choose the minimum “sure thing”. Follow the highest payoff 
 
 




Definitely pick 1 for every period! 
 
 




st period, choose 7, if everyone else chooses 7, keep with that #. If someone chooses something 
other than 7, choose 1 thereafter. 
 
 
Always choose 1. 
 
 




Pick numbers 1 through 3. 1 is the best choice. 
 
 
Choose the minimum 
 
 
Believe it or not, you should always pick the number 1. 
 
 
Pick low numbers 
 
 
For the most profit, choose the lowest number possible each time. 
 
 
Always choose 1, you will make the most money. For predictions always think that all people will choose 1 
except in round 1 where 3 people will choose 1. 
 
 
Always choose 1, someone else will. On the table 1 gives the highest return. Anything else you pick will 
give you less. 
 
 




One is the best choice. Also use one in your predictions. 
 
 
Watch the others but always choose the minimum 
 
 




Always choose number 1. That is the only way to obtain the highest payoff. 
 
 
For most money pick the lowest number. If you want to gamble you could pick high but everybody else has 
to do the same. So I would just pick the lowest number. 
 
 
Always choose 1. You will make the most money. For prediction in the first period put 5 people will pick 
1. Then put 1 in each category above 1. The other predictions all people will choose 1. 
 
 




Alternating can be good.  
 
  
Public Advice Treatment (Subjects get to see the advice left by ALL the 8 players in the immediately 
preceding generation – however this advice is not read aloud – so this corresponds to the situation we 






I was hoping that people would choose 7 in the first round to see if we as a group could maximize our 
profit. Once someone chose 1 in the first round, it was obvious that we weren't going to end up any better 
than what could be made at the lowest number level. 
 
 
Stick with 1 as your choice regardless. This will be the highest payoff. In predictions keep them even (the 
numbers) and put zero in numbers higher than 4. 
 
 
Always choose “1” for most profit. 
 
 
You will get money by choosing 1 but you can’t predict what everyone else will do. Follow your intuition 
and have fun. If everyone would pick 7, you would get more money. However somebody is always afraid 
to take a risk. 
 
 
My advice is to choose the lowest number and keep with it. If you chose a higher number you won’t make 
as much money. 
 
 
Go for one or the lowest number you feel comfortable with. Good luck. 
 
 
Choosing #1 seems to be the most lucrative way to go. 
 
 
If everyone would only choose 7, everyone would get the highest amount. It’s not a lot of money anyway 
so I don’t understand why people don’t just take a gamble and choose 7! I tried to do that but everyone has 
to do it to make it work. It was sort of frustrating that someone had to play it safe every time and choose 1. 





Stick with #7 all of you. 
 
 
Everyone ought to choose 7 on the first period. United you stand, divided you fall. 
 
 
Have fun – don’t always choose the number you think others will do to get some money. We’re not talking 
big dollars here. 
 
 
The only reason to pick any number other than 7 is so that someone else makes less than you. If you all 
pick 7 everyone makes the same and everyone makes the most. After someone decides 1 is good – just go 
with 1, they are not going to change. The obviously don’t understand the value of group agreement. 
 
 
If everyone chooses 7 all will make the most money but once someone picks one they will or someone else 
will continue with that number so to maximize your earnings you will need to as well. Start off with 7 and 
maybe everyone will realize the advantage and you will all be lucky.  
 
 
Always choose #7 to max profit, otherwise everyone will bottom-out and max profit will not be achieved. 
 
 




You will need to make the choice of X=7 each period to make the most $!. I believe all of us are in this 








Choose #7. Don’t be tempted to deviate but everyone must choose #7. 
 
 








Start with 7! Everyone agree at least once. Once someone starts using one  join them. 
 
 
Follow the trend. Ideally you want to maximize at seven but inevitable someone doesn’t get it. 
 
 
Stay with 7 unless someone won’t use that number. If they insist on a lower number go with it. 
 
 






Don’t start with #7 because people will always start in the middle somewhere. 
 
 
Choose 1 always. Although it would be nice to choose 7 and help everyone maximize, there’s always 
someone who doesn’t. So, be safe, always choose 1 and you know you will always make 70 cents because 
you’ll be the lowest number. 
 
 
Follow the advice given on this sheet. Pick 7, then go down to 6 and so on. Everyone follow the trend. 
 
 
Start and stick with 7 to maximize profit. 
 
 
Follow your own instincts, do not go with the trend. There is no actual pattern. 
 
 
Ideally everyone should choose 7 for max profit. However, most people won’t so start with 5 or 6 and then 
follow the trend should someone else go lower than you. 
 
 
EVERYBODY READ THE ADVICE AND ALL PICK “7” TO MAKE THE MOST MONEY. IT IS 
EASY TO TAKE HOME MONEY IF EVERYONE PICKS 7.  
Start with #7, then follow down 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 when someone starts with 1 stick with it. 
 Generation 5 
 
Ideally, everyone should pick 7 every time so you all make the maximum amount. 
However, someone is going to ignore this advice, so once that happens just pick 1. 
 
Start in the middle, like 4 or 5, because everyone will start with 7, expect for probably 1 or 2 people. If 
someone picks 1, that is it, do not pick anything else. 
 
Everybody has to pick 7. It is the best way to make a profit. If you are unsure if to choose 7, then you are 
screwing over everybody else who is trying to help you and themselves earn more!! 
 
Everyone choose 7 to maximize profit. If the min goes down, follow it. 
 
Start out mid-range, 4-5. Someone always stays safe and picks a lower number, but follow the trend down, 
as people pick lower numbers to insure at least average payoff. Stop at 2, though, even if the lowest number 
is always 1. Just in case, never be the lowest number. Good luck! 
 
Start with 7 in the 1
st round. If everyone sticks with 7, then 7 will maximize$ earned. If someone goes low, 
do not trust them to go high again. Go low to maximize your own $. Be smart – stick with 7 – do not be the 
one to go low on the first round. It is less $ for you!! Pick 7 and you will earn $13. Pick 1 you will only get 
$7. 
 
Ideally, everyone would make the most money if everyone chooses 7 and stays with 7,but there is always 
someone who starts in the middle and continues to choose lower numbers. Start around 4 or 5 then follow 
the trend. 
 
Try not to start with 1, but if you see a trend of 1 or another number, follow the trend to maximize your 
profits. Generation 6 : First Generation of the Public-Advice Common Knowledge 
Treatment 
 
Choose 7 all the time. In our group, everyone did so in every round and we all earned the maximum 
amount. 
 
Everyone should always pick 7, you will make the most money and so will everyone else. 
 
Choose 7, but follow any trends that may come about. 
 
Pick 7 every time! Trust everyone to pick 7. I promise it works. It is not a trick. You make the most money. 
If you decide to be selfish and try to win rounds by picking a lower number, you end up making less profit. 
 
Only pick 7. There is no reason not to. If you do, everybody wins. If you don’t, you make less in the long 
run. 
 
It is best to pick 7 all the time because everyone has the same goal and that’s to make the most money. 
Since this advice is read before the experiment actually start, everyone will hear the same thing and 
everyone will pick 7. After the first round, it will be obvious if everyone will pick 7 and trust each other. 
 
Pick 7 if you wanna more money. If you just wanna mess with everyone else and do not care about the 
money then 1 is your number. 
 
Everyone must choose 7! That way everyone will earn the maximum amount of money in this experiment. Generation 7 
 
 
Pick 7 every time, EVERY TIME. If everyone picks 7 every time, everyone will make the max per round 
($1.30 X 10 =$13.00), plus you can make the full $1.28 for each of the predictions rounds. Don’t be stupid. 
Pick 7. Honestly, you’re here for the money anyway, right? 
 
If you don’t start the first round with “7” then the pattern thereafter will be “7”or lower. Bottom line – you 
must begin the first period with a “7” …. Or else!!!! 
  
Pick 7 for crying out loud! But if there is a weirdo who picks lower, pick that number too. Pick 7!!! Trust 
each other it will help you too! 
 
For the first round, you must trust the other participants & choose 7. Choosing 7 gives the maximum 
payoff. The adjust your choice by following the trend after the first round. Be consistent! 
 
It would be best for everyone to choose 7 each time. However, if one person consistently chooses a lower 
number, you will make more profit by conforming to them.  
 
Picking 7 will yield the maximum payoff if everyone picks 7. So start out picking 7, however, some people 
are very untrusting and will pick 6 or 5 – if this happens, follow the trends, if everyone starts picking 6, 
start picking that also.  
 
Chose 7 &and hope everyone else does. But it is important to follow any trends you notice.  
 
The thrill of not choosing seven leads only to a smaller payoff than both you and everyone else could earn.  Generation 8 
 
 
Everyone has to pick 7 every time. Trust the strangers. You all come here for the $, so pick 7 every time. 
Seriously. 
 
I strongly advice you to pick 7 EVERY TIME. Our group was advised to do so, and being smart, we all 
did so. So that way we ALL earned the full $13.00 for the rounds ($1.30*10=$13.00). We all were 
constraint with what each other would pick and it worked out for all of our benefits. 
 
Pick 7 every time. Otherwise, you will drag in the street. Don’t mess with this economics department. They 
mean business. 
 
Everyone just has to start with 7. Trust everyone in the first round. There is no reason not to. If there will be 
someone who chooses other than 7, then you can adjust. 
 
If everyone picks 7, the game goes fast and you make the maximum cash. If you pick lower than 7, you are 
an idiot. You will make less money and also screw over everyone else. So, just pick 7 and leave with $13! 
 
Pick 7 every time. This will lead to maximum payoff! However, if someone starts picking 6, you should 
follow their lead. The best idea is to pick 7! 
 
There isn’t much thinking to this experiment. Just pick 7 EVERY SINGLE TIME!! Be smart about this. 
You benefit from this as long as does everybody else. There is only ONE way to go. Just do it! 
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  APPENDIX:  
Instructions Private Advice 
 
PLAYER ID #___________ 
 
  Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various funding 
agencies have provided funds to conduct this research.  The instructions are 
simple.  If you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you may make 
an appreciable amount of money.  These earnings will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
You will be in a market with 7 other people. In this experiment there will be a 
number of periods.  In each period every participant will pick a value of X. The 
values of X you may choose are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7. The value you pick for X 
and the smallest value picked for X by any participant, including your choice of 
X, will determine the payoff you receive. 
 
You are provided with a table which tells you the potential payoffs you may 
receive.  Please look at the table (on Page 2) now.  The earnings in each period 
may be found by looking across from the value you choose on the left hand side of 
the table and down from the smallest value chosen by any participant from the top 
of the table.  For example if you choose a 4 and the smallest value chosen is a 3 
you earn 80 cents that period. 
 
At the beginning of every period each participant will write down the value of X 
they have chosen on the Record Sheet. (Page 5) The smallest value of X chosen 
will be announced and each participant will then calculate his/her earnings for 
that period.   
 
If you will now look at your record sheet you will see the following entries. 
MARKET PERIOD, BALANCE, YOUR CHOICE OF X, SMALLEST VALUE OF X CHOSEN, and YOUR 
EARNINGS.  In the first period your BALANCE is zero.  In the second period your 
BALANCE is the value of your earnings in the first period.  In the third period 
your BALANCE is the value of your BALANCE in the second period plus the value of 
your earnings in the second period.  And so on.  Please keep accurate records 
throughout the experiment.  
 
All payoffs in this experiment are designated in dollars and cents.  
 
Unless you are in the first group to participate in this experiment, when you 
start the experiment you will receive advice on how to make your decisions 
from a subject who participated in the experiment immediately prior to you.  
This subject will earn an additional payment equal to your earnings in the 10 
decision rounds that you will complete in this experiment. At the end of your 
10 decision rounds you will leave advice to a new subject on how to make 
decisions. On top of what you make in this session of the experiment, you will 
receive an additional payment equal to the earnings of the subject you give 
advice to. Please write your advice on the sheet provided (Page 6). Please 
write or print legibly. You will be notified by e-mail or telephone when your 
second payment is ready.  
 
Each of you is paired with another player, who you do not know and who will 
participate in the experiment immediately after you. You will receive a second 
payment, equal to the amount that this player, who will participate in the 
experiment immediately after you, makes in his or her session. You will be   2
told how to collect this second payment after the instructions have been read. 
 
To be sure that everyone understands the instructions please fill out the sheet 
labeled questions on Page 3 now. Do not put your name or participant number on 
the question sheet. If there are any mistakes on any question sheet the 
experimenter will go over the instructions again. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS 




           PAYOFF  TABLE 
 
 
  SMALLEST VALUE OF X CHOSEN 
 
 
              │   7   │   6   │   5   │   4   │   3   │   2   │   1   │ 
              │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
              │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
         7    │  1.30 │ 1.10  │  .90  │  .70  │  .50  │  .30  │  .10  │ 
 Y            │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
 O            │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
 U       6    │  ---  │ 1.20  │ 1.00  │  .80  │  .60  │  .40  │  .20  │ 
 R            │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
              │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
 C       5    │  ---  │  ---  │ 1.10  │  .90  │  .70  │  .50  │  .30  │ 
 H            │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
 O            │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
 I       4    │  ---  │  ---  │  ---  │ 1.00  │  .80  │  .60  │  .40  │ 
 C            │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
 E            │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
         3    │  ---  │  ---  │  ---  │  ---  │  .90  │  .70  │  .50  │ 
 O            │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
 F            │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
         2    │  ---  │  ---  │  ---  │  ---  │  ---  │  .80  │  .60  │ 
 X            │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
              │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
         1    │  ---  │  ---  │  ---  │  ---  │  ---  │  ---  │  .70  │ 
              │       │       │       │       │       │       │       │ 
 






Please look at your payoff table and fill in the following blanks. 
 
Your choice of X     The smallest value of       Your earnings 
                          X chosen 
4                          2                _____________ 
 
      2                          2                _____________ 
 
      5                          5                _____________ 
     
      6                          4                _____________ 
   4
  EXTRA INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Occasionally you will be asked to predict what every participant will 
choose for X.  When you are asked to do so, please write down your prediction of 
how many people will pick 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1.  When you add your predictions 
of the number of people that will pick each value i.e. 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, they 
should add to 8. 
 
You will be paid for each of your correct predictions as follows.  Your 
earnings will equal 128 cents less the sum of squared differences between your 
predictions and the actual choices. 
 
EXAMPLES:  Suppose that 8 people each had a red ball and a blue ball, and that 
they were all asked to put one and only one of the balls into an urn.  At the 
same time they each were asked to predict the number of red balls and the number 
of blue balls that would end up in the urn.  With a payment rule like that above 
they would find their earnings as follows: 
 
Predict  Actual  Sq.Diff         Predict  Actual  Sq. Diff 
 
Blue      8        0       64      Blue     8       8      0   
 
Red      0        8       64      Red      0       0      0   
 
                       Total      128                  Total        0   
                      
                     128 - 128 =  0                   128 - 0 =  128   
 
                  
 
Predict  Actual  Diff            Predict  Actual  Sq. Diff 
 
Blue      4        4       0       Blue     6        2      16   
 
Red      4        4       0       Red      2        6      16   
 
                       Total      0                   Total       32   
 





You will be told the actual choices made for the periods you were asked to 
make predictions at the end of the experiment. 
 
  IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS PLEASE ASK THEM NOW!!!   5
  RECORD SHEET 
 
 
SEX  M  F               PARTICIPANT #        
circle one 
 
                                                                                          
|               |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
| MARKET PERIOD |  1  |  2  |  3  |  4  | 5   |  6  |  7  |  8  |  9  | 10  |  11 | 
|               |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
|               |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
| BALANCE       |  0  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
|               |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
|               |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
| YOUR CHOICE   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
|   OF  X       |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
|               |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
| SMALLEST VALUE|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
|  OF X CHOSEN  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
|               |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
| YOUR EARNINGS |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | 
|               |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |           
 
Period ____        Period ____             Period ____  
 
Predict Actual Sq.Diff    Predict Actual Sq.Diff    Predict Actual Sq.Diff   
 
7  ____  ____  ____     7  ____  ____  ____      7  ____  ____  ____  
 
6  ____  ____  ____     6  ____  ____  ____      6  ____  ____  ____   
 
5  ____  ____  ____     5  ____  ____  ____      5  ____  ____  ____   
 
4  ____  ____  ____     4  ____  ____  ____      4  ____  ____  ____   
 
3  ____  ____  ____     3  ____  ____  ____     3  ____  ____  ____   
 
2  ____  ____  ____     2  ____  ____  ____      2  ____  ____  ____   
 
1  ____  ____  ____     1  ____  ____  ____      1  ____  ____  ____   
 
 
    Total      ____         Total     ____           Total     ____  
 
128 - ____ = ____      128 - ____ = ____          128 - ____  = ____      6
ADVICE 